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Do Punitive Damages                    
Compensate Society? 
MICHAEL B. KELLY* 
As a retributive device, punitive damages are problematic.  Retribution 
usually is a function of the criminal law, where criminal procedure offers 
defendants considerable safeguards against unjust punishment.  By 
moving punishment into the realm of civil actions, punitive damages 
circumvent those safeguards.1 
The uneasy case for civil punishment may explain the quest to justify 
punitive damages on bases other than retribution.  The origin of punitive 
damages may in fact be compensatory rather than punitive.  Judges 
crafted the category of exemplary damages as a justification for 
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 1. This Article does not contend that the circumvention violates the law.  The 
Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does 
not limit the power of state courts to award punitive damages in actions between private 
parties, where the state neither prosecutes the claim nor has any right to receive a portion 
of the proceeds.  Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 264 
(1989).  Still, the Supreme Court has shared the uneasiness that results when sanctions 
traditionally imposed by criminal law find their way into civil actions.  See United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446–49 (1989) (holding that a civil action brought by federal 
government following criminal prosecution was limited by the Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy clause), overruled by 522 U.S. 93 (1997).  Some state supreme courts share 
uneasiness about circumventing limitations on punishment.  “Thus, the focus of the 
clause is on the impact of the punishment to the individual.  We do not believe the State 
can make an end run around the Excessive Fines Clause by simply making a punishment 
payable to a victim.”  State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 547–51 (Iowa 2000) (ruling 
that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does limit victim restitution award 
of $150,000 imposed as part of a criminal sentence, but affirming the award as not 
excessive) (internal citation omitted). 
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affirming jury awards that exceeded the tangible losses when the award 
seemed appropriate given other losses not then compensable under the 
law.2  Once the law began to compensate for insult, indignity, and distress, 
the need to circumvent the restrictions on recovery disappeared.  But the 
doctrine, originally explained as a punishment to deter, remained. 
Today, efforts to justify punitive damages as compensatory—or at 
least to avoid describing them as retributive—continue.  One of the most 
intriguing is a work by Catherine M. Sharkey entitled Punitive Damages 
as Societal Damages.3  Professor Sharkey suggests that punitive damages, 
to some degree in some cases, actually assess damages incurred by 
members of society who are not parties to any legal action to recover 
them.  The assessment of damages in excess of the plaintiff’s own losses 
may serve as compensation for the losses others suffer but that otherwise 
will not be recovered from the defendant. 
Professor Sharkey reads this purpose in two related changes in 
punitive damages.  From a theoretical standpoint, she draws on deterrence 
theories.  In suggesting that defendants never compensate victims for 
many of the harms defendants cause, these articles identify a shortfall in 
the traditional compensatory damages defendants pay.4  To the extent 
that this shortfall helps justify punitive damages, the assessment takes on 
a less retributive flavor, even if not exactly a compensatory flavor.  
Because punitive damages may not be directed toward the victims who 
suffered the uncompensated losses, that compensatory note may sound a 
bit hollow.  Professor Sharkey’s second insight responds, at least in part.  
From a practical standpoint, she notes a number of jurisdictions that 
require a substantial portion of punitive damages to be paid to the state.5  
Diverting funds to the public puts them to use for the benefit of society, 
not the individual plaintiff.  To the extent that punitive damages do 
represent losses caused to but not recovered by people other than this 
 
 2. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10–19 (1982). 
 3. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 
347 (2003). 
 4. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 366–67.  Deterrence theory urges that defendants 
should internalize all the costs their misconduct causes.  That will create an incentive to 
prevent those losses if the harms exceed the cost of preventing them, but will not 
encourage inefficient prevention (when the cost of prevention exceeds the harm to be 
prevented).  See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 11, 11–15 (1991).  If, however, defendants escape paying the full cost of 
the harms they cause, they will internalize too little of the cost, and their incentive to 
prevent the harms will be too small.  David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for 
Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 271–72 (1989). 
 5. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 375–80; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 
1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2) (West 1998); Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145–46 (Ohio 2002). 
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plaintiff, the state serves as a surrogate for the members of the public 
who were not adequately compensated.  This portion of the punitive 
award, then, compensates the public for harms done to the public. 
Having identified the theory, Professor Sharkey goes further to 
suggest that the funds could be directed to the individual victims of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.  She suggests two ways to achieve this.  She 
suggests a new damages-only class certification, at which other people’s 
claims could be proven.  This procedure would allow the uncompensated 
losses to provide the measure of defendant’s additional damage liability, 
in addition to serving as a conduit to the persons whose need for 
compensation justifies the assessment.  Alternatively, funds could be 
directed to a program that serves the needs of people most likely to be 
victims.  For instance, punitive damages for sexual harassment might be 
used to train defendant’s supervisors on harassment issues.  Punitive 
damages in an insurance case might be directed to the state insurance 
commissioner for use in monitoring and prosecuting inappropriate 
insurance business practices.  These suggestions for redirecting punitive 
damages away from the plaintiff are interesting, but comment on them 
would considerably lengthen this Article.  Instead, I want to focus on the 
theory itself, the concept that punitive damages can be justified as a 
substitute for compensatory damages for harms caused by the defendant 
to persons other than the plaintiff. 
This paper concludes that punitive damages are a poor device for 
redressing harms caused to persons not a party to the action.  Punitive 
damages certainly have a role to play in deterring pure malice.6  How far 
beyond malice punitive damages should go—and whether they should 
be imposed by civil rather than criminal procedure—are open to debate.  
But once punitive damages seek to address concerns beyond the plaintiff 
and the defendant, they raise a series of problems that defy rationalization.  
Considering the harm to society may justify larger awards by circumventing 
limitations inherent in redressing the wrong to only one plaintiff.  But no 
sound justification exists for using punitive damages in this way.7 
 
 6. No matter what else punitive damages may do, they should offset any 
malicious glee a defendant takes from causing harm to another.  While malicious glee 
may be a benefit to the defendant, society should afford that benefit no weight in 
determining the costs and benefits of misconduct. 
 7. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“In 
sum, courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and 
proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages 
recovered.”) (emphasis added). 
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Let me distinguish two other theories that, though related, are not the 
subject of this Article.  One holds that punitive damages compensate the 
plaintiff for losses that damage rules do not satisfy.  The American rule 
on attorneys’ fees leaves plaintiff undercompensated if she recovers 
exactly the amount of her loss.8  Rules on certainty and foreseeability 
may preclude recovery of some losses caused by the breach.  Rules that 
limit plaintiff to the market value of property may underestimate the true 
loss to the plaintiff.9  The problems with this argument are well known.  
These factors are not limited to cases in which defendant acted intentionally 
or recklessly.  Thus, punitive damages will correct these shortcomings in 
only a small percentage of cases.  In addition, punitive damages are not 
measured by the amount of the shortcoming, but by the amount 
necessary to deter similar misconduct in the future.  Thus, punitive damages 
may exceed these uncompensated losses (or, in some cases, may not 
cover the uncompensated losses).10  Finally, and perhaps most important, 
to the extent that these limitations serve legitimate purposes, circumventing 
them via punitive damages undermines those purposes.  Whatever may 
be said against these doctrines, it seems preferable to address them 
directly and amend or eliminate them as appropriate.  In any event, my 
comments below have no import to efforts to compensate the plaintiff in 
the case for losses that she suffered.  This Article addresses only the 
implication that punitive damages can be justified as a means of assessing 
defendant with damages suffered by persons who were not party to the 
action. 
A second related theory notes that punitive damages may resemble 
restitution.  In some cases, juries appear to determine the extent of the 
benefit that defendant reaped by its wrongful conduct and to assess that 
 
 8. Whether the plaintiff’s attorney is paid a portion of the award on a contingency 
or recovers an hourly fee, the plaintiff’s net recovery is less than her full loss. 
 9. Arguably, any owner who was not trying to sell the property probably 
valued it more highly than prospective buyers.  There are many qualifications on 
this insight.  The owner might misperceive prospective buyers’ willingness to pay.  
The owner might value the property less than others, but the expected cost of sale 
might exceed the gains from the trade.  An owner who might value the property 
relatively little might not advert to the possibility of sale.  Still, limiting owners to 
objective value often will undercompensate them, even though allowing subjective value 
risks overcompensating them. 
 10. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), the total damages were 
$33,350, including punitive damages.  Id. at 564–65.  Neither the opinions nor the briefs 
in the case reveal the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.  Perhaps the punitive 
damages would have covered the attorney’s 33% contingency fee.  Still, there is room to 
suspect that the punitive award was a relatively modest portion of the recovery, perhaps 
too little to cover the attorney’s contingency.  Because the case involved a fee shifting 
statute, plaintiffs recovered over $245,000 in attorney’s fees, id. at 565, surely a more 
direct way to address undercompensation. 
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amount as punitive damages.11  While not compensatory, the recovery 
also is not exactly punitive.  It applies restitution principles to remove 
defendant’s gain.  In a proper case, a jury might be instructed to do just 
that.  Typically, however, one would not award restitution on top of an 
award of compensatory damages.  Nor is disgorgement of benefits always 
the measure of restitution.  Finally, when restitution is large enough to 
be punitive, it may involve aggregating the restitution claims of many 
persons.12  To the extent that the restitution approach seeks recovery on 
behalf of persons not represented in the suit, some of the comments 
below may apply equally to it.  But my comments continue to focus on 
plaintiff’s losses, not defendant’s gains. 
Assessing punitive damages in the amount of compensation to 
nonparties may seem too obvious a target.  Merely stating that the award 
includes amounts allegedly lost by persons not party to the action will 
impeach the idea for some.  But respectable authorities urge that damage 
awards can and should exceed the amount needed to compensate the 
plaintiff’s losses in order to make up for the inability of some victims to 
recover.13  That position stems from a criticism that compensatory 
damages underdeter—not because the plaintiff’s own losses are 
undercompensated, but because many of the losses a defendant may 
cause never mature into damage judgments.  If some persons do not 
recover from the defendant for the harms defendant caused, defendant 
has too little incentive to invest in prevention.14  That is particularly true 
when defendant can anticipate that some of the claims either will fail or 
will never be brought.  In order to achieve optimal deterrence, then, 
persons who do recover should be awarded more than their actual 
losses—by just enough to cover the losses to people whose claims 
defendant otherwise might escape. 
As an economic theory, the point is relatively sound.  Indeed, the 
criticism often comes from the other direction—from people who 
 
 11. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 
1981) (discussing the jury’s punitive award of $125 million (arguably based on the 
amount Ford saved by not making fuel tank safer) which was remitted to $3.5 million). 
 12. In Grimshaw, for example, the $125 million punitive damage award represents 
a relatively small savings per car on millions of cars sold.  Presumably, the benefit to 
Ford from the plaintiff was only a small portion of the total benefit.  The total 
accumulates the restitution claims of all buyers, not just the plaintiff. 
 13. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998). 
 14. See Leebron, supra note 4. 
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believe the theory unduly limits punitive damages, rather than from 
people who believe the theory unduly justifies them.15  But when reduced to 
practice, the theory threatens to trammel due process.  The theory, for 
instance, has a counterpart in criminal law, where it suggests imposing 
really large punishments on criminals we catch easily in order to achieve 
greater deterrence for the least amount of law enforcement resources.16  
Whatever the societal benefits by way of deterrence, it seems a bit odd to 
treat criminal defendants as fungible, such that punishing one more than 
she deserves offsets punishing another less than she deserves.  Or 
perhaps economic models of criminal law simply do not appeal. 
As applied to punitive damages, the theory may not treat defendants as 
fungible.  Societal compensatory damages rest on the assumption that 
the defendant’s conduct has more than one victim.  In cases of products 
liability, that commonly will be true.  In cases where the misconduct 
arises from a policy—a discriminatory hiring policy, a policy of denying 
insurance claims regardless of the merits—the policy often will affect 
more than one person.  The goal is to assess defendant for the harms it 
caused to others, not for harms others caused by similar misconduct.  To 
that extent, at least, the theory maintains credibility. 
Nonetheless, due process problems arise.  Three deserve discussion: 
(1) ascertaining the merits of the absent person’s claim, (2) ascertaining 
the proper recipient of the absent person’s claim, and (3) protecting the 
rights of the absent person’s potential future claims. 
The first problem—identifying the merits of the absent person’s 
claim—is the greatest.  Defendants often harm multiple individuals.  
Some of those harmed may not prevail, even if their claims are 
meritorious.17  But the problems that prevent persons from recovering on 
their own claim also make it very difficult to include their claims in the 
plaintiff’s quest for punitive (or societal) damages.  Whether one seeks 
to estimate the other losses in the aggregate (as by formula)18 or 
 
 15. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-
Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003). 
 16. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 17. The victim may never discover some claims.  The victim may elect not to 
bring some claims even if known.  The victim may lose some filed claims on 
technicalities unrelated to the merits (such as the statute of limitations).  The victim may 
lose other filed claims on the merits, despite the need to include those losses in order to 
achieve optimal deterrence (economic loss doctrine). 
 18. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
415 (2003), the Utah Supreme Court reinstated an award of $145 million in punitive 
damages (over a trial court’s remittitur to $25 million) in part because “State Farm will 
only be punished in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability.”  
Id. at 426.  For deterrence purposes, the rate at which State Farm would be compelled to 
pay compensatory damages would be more important than the rate at which it will be 
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individually (Professor Sharkey’s damages-only class), the problem 
remains determining how many of the uncompensated claims there are 
and how many actually deserve compensation. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell19 offers an 
interesting case study.  On its face, it seems to present an appealing case 
for increasing plaintiff’s recovery in light of other claims.  State Farm 
denied Campbell’s insurance claim in part due to its Performance, 
Planning & Review (PP&R) program, a policy aimed at increasing 
profits by reducing the cost of paying claims.20  By aiming the policy at 
“the weakest of the herd,” State Farm tried to exploit the possibility that 
some victims would not sue by singling out exactly those least likely to 
bring a claim.21  The case virtually calls out for augmenting damages to 
make up for the inability of compensatory damages to deter adequately. 
The minute one attempts to put a number on the claims, however, 
problems emerge.  While State Farm’s policy seems to call for rejection 
of meritorious claims, it undoubtedly calls for rejection of meritless 
claims.  The damages to society, thus, include only a subset of the claims 
State Farm rejected.  State Farm is unlikely to keep records revealing 
which claims were denied on the merits and which were denied despite 
the merits.  Indeed, all such claims will be denied on the merits; some 
denials are bad decisions on the merits, but all will masquerade as 
legitimate denials.  One might resolve any uncertainty against State Farm.  
Having formulated a policy that encouraged denying meritorious claims, 
State Farm created uncertainty as to the merits of all claims it rejected.  
Resolving uncertainty by presumption, however, usually follows efforts 
to resolve uncertainty by evidence.  Only when evidence fails to 
establish an issue with sufficient certainty is it necessary to resort to a 
presumption.22  Thus, before assessing State Farm with damages designed 
to compensate other victims, it deserves some opportunity to show that 
the other alleged victims were not damaged by a legal wrong. 
 
punished.  Nonetheless, an estimate of the rate of unsuccessful claims was used to justify 
a larger recovery in this successful claim.  The U.S. Supreme Court found $145 million 
in punitive damages to be excessive and suggested to the Utah courts an amount at or 
near the $1 million compensatory award.  Id. at 429. 
 19. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408. 
 20. Id. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 22. This applies to any rebuttable presumption.  Regardless of where the burden of 
persuasion ultimately falls, evidence on the issue may be admitted by either party. 
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Even once the number of improper rejections is known, the amount of 
harm caused by each rejection must be calculated.  While some claims 
may involve set amounts (the death benefit in a life insurance policy, for 
example), other claims will involve disputed amounts (the value of 
property destroyed by a fire), and still others will involve nonpecuniary 
amounts (the distress suffered as a result of denying the claim).  In 
Campbell, the entire claim was for distress.  Although State Farm refused a 
settlement and initially refused to cover the excess judgment against its 
insured, it eventually paid all pecuniary losses before suit.  The bad faith 
claim involved only the distress suffered because of these initial refusals 
to pay.  The jury assessed that distress at $2.6 million.23  But a jury will 
have considerably more difficulty assessing the distress of persons not 
before the court.  Even if the conduct that allegedly caused the distress 
can be presented without the victim’s testimony, the severity of the 
effect upon each victim cannot be ascertained with any confidence. 
My objection is only partially practical.  To a large degree, my concern is 
with due process.  While a formula might be devised to estimate the 
extent of harm wrongfully caused by State Farm’s misconduct, that 
formula engages in presumptions about the merits of other potential 
cases.  Some of these potential cases have not been brought to court and, 
thus, never proven to the satisfaction of the legal system.  Worse, some 
of the cases have been brought to court and have been resolved by the 
legal system, but resolved against the plaintiffs for reasons that do not 
alter the desire to deter defendants.  The decision to include other people’s 
claims (whether unsuccessful or unbrought) in the plaintiff’s claim 
circumvents all the requirements of bringing and proving an action.  In 
effect, due process for defendant simply falls from the equation.24 
Perhaps insurance bad faith claims are too easy a target.  Consider, 
then, a product liability case, in which all claims involve an identical 
design defect.  The Ford Pinto cases make a good illustration.25  The 
design defect made the Pinto more prone than most similar cars to leak 
fuel or burn when hit from behind.  We may assume (arguendo) that the 
issue of whether the Pinto was defective should be resolved the same 
way in every case.26  But that will not necessarily mean that every 
 
 23. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 412–16.  The trial court subsequently reduced this 
compensatory damage award to $1 million.  Unlike the trial court’s reduction of the 
punitive award, the compensatory reduction was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.  Id. 
at 415. 
 24. Yes, defendant does get due process in the claim brought by this one plaintiff.  
But if one plaintiff could establish the rights of all others, without evidence relating to 
the claims of others, class actions would be unnecessary.  The circumvention here is 
significant. 
 25. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 26. Juries might disagree on the issue of defect for any number of idiosyncratic 
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person injured by fire in a rear end collision should recover from Ford.  
Causation remains an issue: some fires might have occurred even if the 
Pinto had a state-of-the-art design (as when the accident occurs at speeds 
that even the best tank cannot withstand).  Contributory negligence (or a 
similar defense) might play a part either in liability or in damages (if the 
rear-end collision was caused by the Pinto driver’s negligence).27  
Finally, even if liability is clear, the amount to include as damages for 
other victims may be unclear.  The severity of injuries may vary among 
the accidents.  Even within the most severe cases, damages for death and 
total disability vary greatly with the earning capacity of the victim. 
Perhaps the example is, again, poorly chosen.  With injuries this 
severe and a defect this well publicized, perhaps everyone will bring an 
individual suit, leaving no hole for societal compensatory damages to 
fill.28  If so, then societal compensation offers no justification for punitive 
damages in these cases.  Perhaps a less severe injury, such as the damaged 
paint in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,29 leaves more room for 
societal compensation.  But the problems of assessing how many others to 
include in compensation remain.  BMW raised the difficulty of conduct 
that was not wrongful in most states.30  It also raises the second issue for 
discussion: determining the proper beneficiary of the absent person’s 
claim. 
Societal damages seek to protect claims that others could have brought 
even if they did not bring them.  Where the harms to the plaintiff are 
relatively modest, there are many reasons that people might choose not 
 
reasons.  Variations among the states in the definition of defect might lead an identical 
jury hearing identical evidence to produce different results.  Differences in rules on 
admissibility might compound the variations.  Still, each car had an identical design; it 
seems odd to contend that one was defective while an identical car was not.  For 
purposes of discussion, therefore, this Article assumes uniform results on this aspect of 
the cases. 
 27. Indeed, Ford won at least one of the claims brought alleging injuries from burn 
after a rear-end collision.  See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1030 n.66 (1991) (citing a report by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA)). 
 28. Gary Schwartz reported data gathered by the NHTSA.  A total of thirty-eight 
accidents involved fuel leakage or fire after a Pinto suffered a rear end collision.  These 
produced twenty-seven deaths and twenty-four nonfatal burns, resulting in twenty-nine 
lawsuits.  Id. at 1030 & n.66.  Some of the cases involved more than one victim; 
Grimshaw, for example, involved two people.  Id. at 1016.  Thus, twenty-nine lawsuits 
might include all fifty-one victims. 
 29. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1996). 
 30. Id. at 569 n.13. 
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to pursue their own claim.  Some of these reasons suggest the victim’s 
intent to allow the defendant to keep any unpaid portion of the claim.  
That is clearest with settlements, where the plaintiff waives any claim to 
a greater amount in return for immediate (and undisputed) entitlement to 
a lesser amount.  Settlements may not comport with the economist’s 
desire for full internalization.  Yet it is difficult to assert that the 
remainder of the loss should be recovered in a different plaintiff’s suit.  
Whatever amount plaintiff left on the table, defendant bargained for it 
and plaintiff accepted the bargain.  It belongs to defendant, not some 
third party. 
Another reason involves forgiveness.  Some victims believe in forgiving 
those who sin against them.  That forgiveness is a gift to the defendant.  
It is not a gift to a subsequent plaintiff, to the state, to a charitable 
organization, or to any other person who might receive the proceeds of 
societal compensatory damages.  To redirect it undermines the plaintiff’s 
act of forgiveness. 
Arguably, even victims who want to sue but find the cost prohibitive 
intend a gift to the defendant.31  These victims weigh the cost to 
themselves against the prospect of letting the defendant keep whatever 
they might recover in a suit.  In deciding not to sue, these victims know 
to a substantial certainty that the defendant retains the potential 
damages.  No matter how much society might wish that these plaintiffs 
had instead aggregated their claim with the claims of other plaintiffs, 
setting aside the decision not to proceed arguably alters the allocation of 
rights and benefits the victim created. 
Perhaps none of these is insurmountable.  With a less costly procedure 
(such as the damages-only class proposed by Professor Sharkey), some 
people might press their claims rather than let defendant off the hook.  
More globally, perhaps society should be allowed to use other people’s 
potential claims to achieve its deterrence goals, even if that involves 
overriding those people’s wishes, express or implied.  Trumping individual 
wishes seems problematic.  To my knowledge, no one has proposed that 
waivers, gifts, settlements, or other techniques whereby defendants are 
released from liability violate public policy.32  One imagines a practical 
difficulty of persuading people to testify about their claims if they have 
 
 31. Cost here is not limited to pecuniary costs.  The cost in time and emotional 
stress of engaging in litigation may dissuade some persons from bringing suits. 
 32. Contract law once could have justified that position.  The preexisting duty rule 
could be deployed to argue that a release given in exchange for a settlement lacked 
consideration if the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for more than the settlement 
amount.  Modern weakening of the rule makes clear that a release can be valid even if 
defendant would have been held liable for a greater sum had the case proceeded to trial.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1981). 
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decided not to undertake the cost (whether due to settlement contract, 
inertia, or forgiveness).  The decision to assess the damages incurred by 
one victim and incorporate them into another victim’s suit seems to 
require some consent (at least a failure to opt out) from the first victim.  
Societal damages, either as an assessment technique or as a rationale for 
punitive damages, make no effort to take these wishes into account. 
A third due process problem is that societal damages risk endangering 
other victims’ potential future claims.  Societal damages change over 
time.  Each time a new case is decided, the uncompensated portion of 
societal damages decreases.33  Thus, the amount of uncompensated 
societal compensatory damages depends on the number of claims that 
have already been concluded.  More importantly, however, the amount 
also depends on the number of claims that will be concluded.  If 
individual claims will be concluded in the future, the assessment of 
societal compensatory damages should not include the amounts at issue 
in those future claims.  Even more problematic, the amount of societal 
damages assessed in one case should vary with the amount of societal 
damages collected in other cases, both past and future. 
Perhaps claims already brought can be identified and excluded from 
consideration when calculating societal damages.34  Future claims are 
much more difficult to anticipate and evaluate.  Including the losses 
these future cases might claim in today’s action forces one of two 
undesirable results: the future plaintiff may be denied recovery on the 
ground that defendant has already paid that loss; or the defendant will be 
compelled to pay the damages twice, once in the societal damage award 
in the earlier action and again to the future plaintiff.  Paying twice 
produces overdeterrence.  Denying the future claim works a hardship, if 
not an injustice, on the victim whose claim is denied.35 
 
 33. If plaintiff wins, the damages are compensated, bringing defendant closer to 
full internalization of costs.  If plaintiff loses on the merits, the damages are not 
attributable to defendant’s wrong, thus forming no part of the loss to society that 
defendant should internalize.  The assertion in the text may be slightly overstated, given 
the possibility that plaintiff might lose despite presenting a meritorious claim. 
 34. There is room to suspect that some claims will escape notice.  Perhaps 
defendants will reveal claims already made in an effort to limit the amount of societal 
damages for which it might be held liable.  That flies in the face of common practice, 
seeking to prevent the jury from knowing about other similar claims.  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 
403, 404(b). 
 35. This problem can arise in any class action.  The limitations on recognizing 
class actions seek to minimize any injustice that might result.  Professor Sharkey, in 
proposing damages-only classes, seeks to include these mechanisms in her proposal.  
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One last point deserves note.  The problem of underdeterrence due to 
unsuccessful claims is not limited to cases where punitive damages 
might be available.  Even when no intentional or reckless misconduct 
can be proven, victims who do not bring claims or who do not prevail on 
them may prevent internalization of all of the costs of defendant’s 
misconduct.  The theory of societal damages, thus, proves too much.  
Rather than justifying punitive damages, it justifies group compensatory 
damages in a broad array of settings.36 
That idea has emerged in some cases.  Class representatives sometimes 
ask a court to assess the entire amount that the defendant owes for 
losses, then let the class distribute it appropriately among the members.37  
Courts have been reluctant to take that approach.38  Sometimes a 
classwide settlement may produce a fund that exceeds the claims made 
by the identifiable members of the class, producing a residual amount 
that the court may administer.  But a court assessing damages in a class 
action rarely assesses the total losses in the abstract.  Rather, when 
damages are individual, a class judgment of liability engenders 
individual claims for specific amounts, which must be proven as with 
any other claim for damages in court.39  Courts are reluctant to create 
remedies that might be distributed to persons who were not the victims 
of the original wrong.40  Indeed, even when the parties are before the 
 
The issue addressed here, however, is whether a compensatory rationale can explain 
punitive damages, not whether a new form of class action might evolve to take care of 
the same problem. 
 36. One might argue that underdeterrence, while suboptimal in any case, is 
intolerable in cases involving intentional or reckless misconduct.  The greater importance 
of deterring these greater wrongs justifies a more aggressive stance, despite the due 
process concerns.  This position seems to move the justification back toward retribution, 
letting state of mind, not undercompensation, differentiate the cases where additional 
deterrence is needed.  At the very least, the argument raises questions about the true role 
underdeterrence plays in the mix. 
 37. See, e.g., Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the trial court correctly refused to award class-wide judgment 
after finding liability), cert. granted in part, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6696. 
 38. The court in Allapattah noted several obstacles to calculating damages on a 
class-wide basis: 
These obstacles include (1) accounting for those [plaintiffs] who either have 
opted out of the class or not submitted claims; (2) accounting for those 
[plaintiffs] whose claims were barred by the Ohio statute of limitations; (3) the 
difficulty of awarding prejudgment interest on a class-wide basis when the 
applicable amount of interest varies from state to state; and (4) determining 
whether the dealers’ claims are subject to further reduction by set-off claims 
asserted by Exxon. 
Id. at 1257. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(rejecting a fluid recovery concept to bypass the manageability requirement for class 
actions), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
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court, efforts to assess damages on a general or group basis are subject 
to criticism.41  These doctrines stand in the way of any effort to 
reconceptualize punitive damages as a form of class compensation.  
When proposed directly, this form of class compensation has been 
rejected.  Using punitive damages as a way to circumvent the procedural 
restrictions on this form of compensation should raise a red flag. 
That red flag may be the central point of this Article.  As the core 
theories of punitive damages face more criticism and more restrictions, 
theorists reach farther afield to find new justifications for the continued 
existence of this recovery.  Each new justification seems to be an effort 
to circumvent or distort civil procedure.  Punitive damages may dodge 
the American rule on attorneys’ fees, the difficulty of certifying class 
actions, the technicalities of the statute of limitations, the transaction 
costs of litigation, and other components of the litigation process.  Yet 
punitive damages do nothing to confront the problems created by (or 
solved by) these rules.  Rather, punitive damages undermine efforts to 
correct these problems.  They serve as a safety valve, releasing the steam 
that otherwise might propel changes to these rules—or that otherwise 
might dissipate in the face of the value of these rules.  By diverting 
attention from the source of the problems, punitive damages don’t solve 
anything (or don’t solve enough). 
These arguments, of course, do not have implications for other 
justifications of punitive damages.  That is a work for other articles or, 
perhaps, for the Supreme Court.  One senses a relationship between 
recent developments in the Supreme Court and the efforts to find new 
justifications for punitive damages.  When confined to rationales like 
retribution, punitive damages may be more limited than they have been 
in the recent past.42  That may concern persons who believe the threat of 
 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1958) 
(awarding each plaintiff identical amounts for distress). 
  Apparently the court found a total amount which should be awarded to all 
plaintiffs for pain and suffering, and divided it equally among them.  There 
was no more justification for such division than there would have been in 
using the total value of the seized animals and dividing it equally among the 
plaintiffs.  Pain and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a 
common injury, and must be so treated. 
Id. at 925. 
 42. Justice Ginsburg’s prediction that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements may 
be difficult to administer suggests that the limits may be wishful thinking more than 
actual change.  If state courts search for ways to do exactly what they would have done 
anyway, the Supreme Court may not be able to review enough cases to enforce its 
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nearly unlimited punitive damages is essential to coerce good conduct by 
large corporations.  Thus, the effort to circumvent the limitations imposed 
by the Supreme Court may begin by expanding the underlying rationale 
for punitive damages. 
This Article urges that we not take punitive damages as so great a good 
that we run roughshod over due process in our zeal to preserve them.  
Compensation to society, in order to be administered fairly, requires 
more than a judgment in an individual suit followed by an expression of 




approach.  If, however, state courts take the new promulgations seriously, some 
reduction in the size of punitive awards may result. 
